China’s interest in antisatellite weapons had quickened after the 1991 Gulf War showcased the accuracy of U.S. space-guided weapons. ❋ Unknown (2008)
Furthermore, Washington is undertaking initiatives — including advances in antisatellite warfare and in wide-area remote sensing, designed to find “relocatable” mobile missile launchers — that will make China’s nuclear forces vulnerable. ❋ Unknown (2007)
In January 2007, China successfully demonstrated an antisatellite weapon. ❋ Charles Miller (2012)
Furthermore, political considerations are unlikely to allow the use of antisatellite weapons in most scenarios. ❋ Unknown (2009)
A year after China's antisatellite test, the U.S. demonstrated its own capabilities by blowing up a dead spy satellite with a modified ballistic-missile interceptor. ❋ Julian E. Barnes (2012)
Beyond the new stealth fighter, he pointed to Beijing's development of antisatellite and antiship technologies, which could affect U.S. forces. ❋ Yuha Hayashi (2011)
Other China watchers have expressed concern about China's ability to wage "asymmetric" warfare through cyberattacks, antisatellite weapons or other means. ❋ Nathan Hodge (2011)
Defense Pitch CRT: Test Flight Color Commentary Mr. Hong said the J-20's size suggested that it was designed to carry more weapons than the F-22, possibly including antisatellite missiles, and would challenge U.S. air superiority in the region regardless of whether F-22 production was re-started. ❋ Jeremy Page (2011)
While China is likely to be rational in its use of antisatellite weapons, the same cannot be said about North Korea and Iran. ❋ Charles Miller (2012)
The Pentagon and U.S. intelligence agencies had watched silently as the Chinese fired two earlier antisatellite missiles — misses or dry runs — before hitting the target on the third try. ❋ Unknown (2008)
Even if this was not the case, the intercept offered the United States the policy equivalent of a threefer: save the world from hydrazine, test a missile-defense rocket as an antisatellite weapon, and put the Chinese on notice that we can kill satellites, too. ❋ Unknown (2008)
Then, in the 1980s, after many antisatellite tests with nonnuclear weapons, the two superpowers stopped destructive testing. ❋ Unknown (2008)
Not only was the U.S. destruction of its own satellite less transparent and straightforward than billed, but it looks to have been part of a larger U.S. effort, mostly out of public view, to develop antisatellite weapons and to militarize space, with potentially catastrophic consequences. ❋ Unknown (2008)
With the military playing field tilted sharply in favor of the United States, antisatellite weapons could be a leveler. ❋ Unknown (2008)
Beijing's strategy, known as "access denial," involves fielding a large submarine force, developing cruise and ballistic missiles that could take out an American aircraft carrier, and deploying antisatellite weapons that can disrupt U.S. communications. ❋ Unknown (2010)
These included quick ground-based counterstrikes to disable enemy antisatellite jammers and lasers, and better space-based sensors to detect these attacks and perhaps enable the United States to forestall them by going “proactive.” ❋ Unknown (2008)
