Nid drwy 'newid' y neges y llwyddwyd gwneud hyn ond drwy gwaith caib a rhaw o ddrws i ddrws, yn raddol ddileu'r hen ragfarnau, yn rhoi cyfle i bobol weld bod y 'neges' yr un mor berthnasol iddyn nhw ag i drigolion Ceredigion neu Chaerffili. ❋ Dyfrig (2008)
If a mattock caib had just been invented, I am sure that they would baptise it an 'offeryn miniog deuben'....... and then scratch their heads as to why people aren't using the word at all. ❋ Unknown (2008)
That was the form that the physical investigation took on, with hundreds of NASA engineers and technicians doing most of the detailed work, and the caib watching closely and increasingly stepping in. ❋ Unknown (2003)
In an effort closely supervised by the caib, groups of NASA engineers created several thousand flow charts, one for each scenario that could conceivably have led to the re-entry breakup. ❋ Unknown (2003)
He realized that she and the others would have to leave the caib, and he wrote a careful letter to O'Keefe in Washington, requesting their immediate removal. ❋ Unknown (2003)
One of the principal caib agents there was an affable Air Force pilot named Patrick Goodman, an experienced accident investigator who had made both friends and enemies at NASA for the directness of his approach. ❋ Unknown (2003)
At the NASA facilities dedicated to shuttle operations (Alabama for rockets, Florida for launch and landing, Texas for management and mission control) the caib investigators were seen as invaders of sorts, unwelcome strangers arriving to pass judgment on people's good-faith efforts. ❋ Unknown (2003)
Douglas Osheroff, a normally good-humored Stanford physicist and Nobel laureate who joined the caib late, went around for months in a state of incredulity and dismay at what he was learning about NASA's operational logic. ❋ Unknown (2003)
Months later one of the caib investigators who had followed this trail was still seething with anger at what had occurred. ❋ Unknown (2003)
By a twist of fate it was the sole NASA member of the caib, the quiet, cerebral, earnestly scientific Scott Hubbard, who insisted that the test proceed. ❋ Unknown (2003)
In the days following the accident O'Keefe had established an internal Mishap Investigation Team, whose job was to work closely with the caib, essentially as staff, and whose members — bizarrely — included some of the decision-makers most closely involved with the Columbia's final flight. ❋ Unknown (2003)
Months later now, in the wake of Gehman's rebellion, and with the caib aggressively moving beyond the physical causes and into the organizational ones, he found himself in the tricky position of collaborating with a group that many of his own people at NASA saw as the enemy. ❋ Unknown (2003)
At the caib, Gehman, who was not unsympathetic to NASA, watched these reactions with growing skepticism and a sense of déjà vu. ❋ Unknown (2003)
Congress in particular was thundering that Gehman was a captive investigator, that his report would be a whitewash, and that the White House should replace the caib with a Challenger-style presidential commission. ❋ Unknown (2003)
He allowed the new civilian members to be brought on through the NASA payroll (at prorated annual salaries of $134,000) — a strange lapse under the circumstances, and one that led to superficial accusations that the caib remained captive. ❋ Unknown (2003)
He had been assigned to assist the caib, and had been watching the investigation with mixed emotions — hopeful that some effects might be positive, but concerned as well that the inquiry might veer into formalism without sufficiently taking into account the radical nature of space flight, or the basic truth that every layer of procedure and equipment comes at a cost, often unpredictable. ❋ Unknown (2003)
One of the toughest and most experienced of the caib investigators later told me he had a gut sense that NASA continued to hide relevant information, and that it does so to this day. ❋ Unknown (2003)
The caib discovered that on the morning of January 17, the day after the launch, the low-level engineers at the Kennedy Space Center whose job was to review the launch videos and film were immediately concerned by the size and speed of the foam that had struck the shuttle. ❋ Unknown (2003)
One morning several of the board members came in to see Gehman, and warned him that the caib was headed for a "shipwreck." ❋ Unknown (2003)
The caib, however, discovered a history of more-serious cases. ❋ Unknown (2003)
[oi] that caibs kid is a [fucken] maaaaaad [cunt]. ❋ Caibsta (2004)
