Those philosophers who think there is a way to consistently maintain both (1) and (2) are called compatibilists about infallible foreknowledge and human free will. ❋ Zagzebski, Linda (2008)
While there are some philosophers who assert that free will can exist in a deterministic materialistic world (they're called "compatibilists"), and some have argued that quantum indeterminacy may leave room for free will, the most parsimonious explanation for free will is that there is an immaterial component of the mind that is undetermined by matter. ❋ Unknown (2009)
While there are some philosophers who assert that free will can exist in a deterministic materialistic world (they’re called "compatibilists"), and some have argued that quantum indeterminacy may leave room for free will, the most parsimonious explanation for free will is that there is an immaterial component of the mind that is undetermined by matter. ❋ Unknown (2008)
Reading between the lines, it sounds like all three are compatibilists of some stripe, report later seems to take for granted the traditional dichotomy, whereby an action can be a case of “free will or predetermined by the laws of nature” (emphasis mine). ❋ Unknown (2009)
Strawson held that both the incompatibilists and the compatibilists had misconstrued the nature of moral responsibility. ❋ McKenna, Michael (2009)
The compatibilists 'main adversaries are incompatibilists, who deny the compatibility of free will and determinism. ❋ McKenna, Michael (2009)
Typically, the classical compatibilists 'benchmark of impeded or encumbered action is compelled action. ❋ McKenna, Michael (2009)
So the classical compatibilists analyzed any assertion that an agent could have done otherwise as a conditional assertion reporting what an agent would have done under certain counterfactual conditions. ❋ McKenna, Michael (2009)
That perspective and those attitudes can be used to shine a light on the conditions for morally responsible agency and, especially, on the kind of freedom compatibilists and incompatibilists are concerned to discuss. ❋ McKenna, Michael (2009)
Despite this qualification, given the classical compatibilists 'failure, they had no reply to the Classical Incompatibilist Argument. ❋ McKenna, Michael (2009)
Thus, the one-way classical compatibilists relied exclusively on a Source model of control. ❋ McKenna, Michael (2009)
What the classical compatibilists attempted to do by way of their conditional analysis was deny the truth of the second premise: If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise. ❋ McKenna, Michael (2009)
And this, Slote and other compatibilists (such as Dennett, 1984a) have suggested, is to draw incompatibilist conclusions illicitly from reasonable claims regarding unavoidability. ❋ McKenna, Michael (2009)
In this way, compatibilists would turn away from the Garden of Forking Paths model of control and seek some other model as the intuitive basis for the kind of control pertinent to morally responsible agency. ❋ McKenna, Michael (2009)
As for the Classical Incompatibilist Argument, some compatibilists have responded to this argument by denying the truth of the second premise: If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise than one actually does. ❋ McKenna, Michael (2009)
Frankfurt's attack on PAP (see section 4.2) prompted many contemporary compatibilists to develop accounts of compatibilist freedom that make no appeal to regulative control as modeled on a Garden of Forking Paths. ❋ McKenna, Michael (2009)
This, at least, is how compatibilists like Fischer and Ravizza would reason. ❋ McKenna, Michael (2009)
In his seminal 1969 paper, “Moral Responsibility and Alternate Possibilities,” Harry Frankfurt developed an argument that gave compatibilists the resources to argue in just this way. ❋ McKenna, Michael (2009)
