The two second-level relaton relations of compresence and exact resemblance are essential to the cluster theory. ❋ Bacon, John (2008)
Let P (t) be t's compresence equivalence-class, and let I be ❋ Bacon, John (2008)
Let us call a triple consisting of a set T of qualitons, a binary relation thereon of exact similarity R, and a binary relation C of compresence, a trope structure (Mormann: generalized trope space). ❋ Bacon, John (2008)
In effect, it would be a representative of the compresence equivalence-class constituting the individual (from the qualiton-structural point of view). ❋ Bacon, John (2008)
Thus Williams takes an individual to be the mereological sum of a compresence class (1953: 81). ❋ Bacon, John (2008)
On the actualist approach, Putin is devious iff his first compresence class overlaps deviousness. ❋ Bacon, John (2008)
But = sheds new light on the two structural relations, exact similarity (R) and compresence (C), apparently presupposed for qualiton structures. ❋ Bacon, John (2008)
(F) in the particular is then grounded not in the compresence of an opposite property, but in the compresence of another property. ❋ Silverman, Allan (2008)
By way of contrast, properties such as being brown or being a cow do not suffer compresence when instantiated by particulars. ❋ Silverman, Allan (2008)
And since compresence requires complexity, the material nature of particulars is one of the roots of each material, sensible particular being both F and not-F. ❋ Silverman, Allan (2008)
In order to avoid this outcome, while allowing for some complexity in the Form, those emphasizing the compresence of opposites can insist that it is the strict opposite, Inequality or being unequal, that Plato excludes from the Form, not another property, e.g., beauty, which happens not to be identical with Equality. ❋ Silverman, Allan (2008)
For, according to this reading, every sensible property type suffers from this compresence of opposites, i.e., is F and not-F. ❋ Silverman, Allan (2008)
Hence the Form, The F Itself, does not suffer compresence (at least with respect to being F). ❋ Silverman, Allan (2008)
In order to appreciate fully the rationale for this account, one needs to consider Plato's account of particulars, for the compresence of opposites is meant to capture in what sense particulars are deficient with respect to Forms. ❋ Silverman, Allan (2008)
The spatio-temporal, material character of particulars also contributes directly to the explanation of their suffering, and seeming to suffer, the compresence of opposites. ❋ Silverman, Allan (2008)
Particulars appear, and perhaps are, both F and not-F for some property F: particulars suffer from the compresence of opposites. ❋ Silverman, Allan (2008)
Since, according to this approach, Plato is seeking a large that is the unqualified bearer of largeness, and since every particular is disqualified in light of compresence, Plato postulates a Form, ❋ Silverman, Allan (2008)
There is reason to doubt that the compresence of opposites or the mere complexity of particulars is responsible for their deficiency (but see Fine 1993, esp. ❋ Silverman, Allan (2008)
Compresation is compressing an [object]. ❋ MemeGurl (2019)
