If you continue reading your Wiki you will see that not all materialism is eliminativist materialism. ❋ Unknown (2008)
Moreover, by analyzing statements of some leading contemporary scholars who support social constructivism about race, I hope to demonstrate that their eliminativist views are actually in conflict with what the best contemporary science tells us about human genetic variation. ❋ Unknown (2010)
I am technically correct about Schwartz because even an eliminativist does not have any difficulty with brain changes resulting from information processing in the brain, as Schwartz claims. ❋ Unknown (2008)
We consider this response in section 4, where we discuss the eliminativist views of Peter Unger (1979), Peter van Inwagen ❋ Wasserman, Ryan (2009)
In this section, we briefly introduce three versions of this eliminativist view. ❋ Wasserman, Ryan (2009)
You confuse Dennett's stance with eliminative materialism (Dennett may be considered an eliminativist with respect to qualia, which he considers an incohent concept, but not with respect to intentionality, beliefs, or agency). ❋ Unknown (2007)
First off, Dennett is an eliminativist about qualia, not about intentionality or agency. ❋ Unknown (2007)
The dominant kinds view has several advantages over the eliminativist views discussed in the previous section. ❋ Wasserman, Ryan (2009)
I mean, it was freaking obvious considering Dennett denies qualia and is well known for being an eliminativist (do you guys know what that means?) when it comes to various mental properties. ❋ Unknown (2007)
Still want to maintain that Dennett is an eliminativist about intentionality? ❋ Unknown (2007)
The eliminativist believes that intentionality is ontologically reducible to the non-intentional without remainder. ❋ Unknown (2007)
Within the philosophy of mind, an eliminativist materialism is the most radical form of materialism as it further posits that mental states (e.g., desire, hope) are not real, do not truly exist, but rather are artifacts of a "folk psychology," artifacts that neuroscience and other purportedly pure scientific disciplines will some day, at some more enlightened point in the future, vanquish. ❋ Unknown (2009)
There are other ways of being eliminativist about pains having to do with the nature of qualia or the alleged existence of apparent phenomenal objects. ❋ Aydede, Murat (2009)
In response to philosopher Daniel Dennett's "Consciousness Explained," a widely admired 1991 book that debunks the idea of a central "observer" in the brain, some dissenting sages brand the author an "eliminativist." ❋ Unknown (2008)
This residual ambivalence, to recall the metaphysical discussions of the last section, perhaps ground Mallon's contention that Appiah remains an eliminativist rather than a racial constructivist, since ideally Appiah would prefer to be free of all residual constraints entailed by even socially constructed races. ❋ James, Michael (2008)
