Traditional epistemologists, that is, those who do not advocate naturalizing epistemology, typically carry out this activity in their armchairs. ❋ Feldman, Richard (2001)
So while we pursue the philosophical question about who or what killed Dzieka? ski, as good epistemologists, we need to get clear about what sources of information we can trust. ❋ Unknown (2009)
This literature has been mistakenly rejected by many otherwise reasonable folk (section 2), and it has been woefully neglected by contemporary ethicists, epistemologists and philosophers of science (sections 3 − 6). ❋ Unknown (2009)
Actually that was a quite interesting thread, at least for epistemologists like me. ❋ Unknown (2010)
Stupidist epistemologists trace these failures to flawed conceptions of knowledge, knowers, objectivity, and scientific methodology. ❋ Gordon McCabe (2009)
Holes are an interesting case-study for ontologists and epistemologists. ❋ Casati, Roberto (2009)
In fact, there is an important connection between this lacuna in Laudan's famous discussion and the further uses made of the thesis of underdetermination by sociologists of scientific knowledge, feminist epistemologists, and other vocal champions of holist underdetermination. ❋ Stanford, Kyle (2009)
At any rate, as contemporary epistemologists remind us, foundationalist epistemological projects and exclusively Euclidean approaches to cognitive systematization are no longer plausible. ❋ Unknown (2008)
Whether or not this “negative” strengthening of a reliability condition satisfactorily resolves the non-sufficiency challenge, many epistemologists are persuaded by non-sufficiency examples that a reliability-based condition needs to be strengthened if the approach is to be viable. ❋ Goldman, Alvin (2008)
The goal of this entry is to give the reader an overview of the formal tools available to epistemologists for the representation of belief. ❋ Huber, Franz (2008)
More generally, epistemologists and philosophers of science have taken up the project of accommodating social influence in the production of knowledge, and this project is well underway in contemporary social epistemology and philosophy of science (e.g. Boyd 1992; Kitcher 1993, 2001). ❋ Mallon, Ron (2008)
No doubt it's an important problem for epistemologists and philosophers of science to explain how general theories can nonetheless be confirmed and believed. ❋ Cowie, Fiona (2008)
Typically, epistemologists are concerned with the conditions under which a subject may know or be certain that p at a particular moment. ❋ Reed, Baron (2008)
Chisholm held that epistemologists did not need the assistance of the empirical sciences in answering their purely epistemological questions. ❋ Feldman, Richard (2008)
Since Plato, philosophers have considered the idea that stable true belief is better than unstable true belief, and epistemologists such as Sklar [1975] have advocated similar principles of “epistemic conservatism”. ❋ Schulte, Oliver (2008)
Some scientists and epistemologists hope to replace the Popperian view of proof with a Bayesian view. ❋ William Harryman (2007)
And pace some analytical epistemologists, belief is in some cases voluntary. ❋ Mike L (2007)
At this point one might wonder why it matters so much to (some) epistemologists that true belief is finally valuable. ❋ Pritchard, Duncan (2007)
Interestingly, however, other virtue epistemologists, most notably Ernest Sosa (2003), have also advocated a ˜credit™ view of this sort, yet seem to stay within the machine-product picture of belief that Zagzebski thinks is so problematic. ❋ Pritchard, Duncan (2007)
