Falsidical

Since it is written into the proposal that the gap gets a value when the subject of the experience sees an object that appears to have the properties attached to the gap, the experience in the cube case will be falsidical, since even though there is a red cube at l, that cube is not the one you see. ❋ Siegel, Susanna (2005)

The problem presented by the constancies is to show how it is that the constant and varying features don't conflict in such a way as to make the experience falsidical (for having contradictory contents). ❋ Siegel, Susanna (2005)

The cube you see is not red and at L, so the contents are false, hence the experience is falsidical. ❋ Siegel, Susanna (2005)

For instance, many have the intuition that the following experience is falsidical: you see a fish that appears blue to you, but is actually red. ❋ Siegel, Susanna (2005)

With respect to this case, the view that says that objects are represented in experience via object-property contents such as (1) will predict that your experience is inaccurate (˜falsidical™), because the cube you see is not red and at L. ❋ Siegel, Susanna (2005)

According to the intuition, the fish's failing to be blue suffices for the experience to be falsidical. ❋ Siegel, Susanna (2005)

Given an experience ” either one we actually have, or a hypothetical one ” we at least sometimes have intuitions about whether the experience is accurate (“veridical”) or inaccurate (“falsidical”). ❋ Siegel, Susanna (2005)