With the word "foundation", I had assimilated the image of something that was based on a support and therefore, when Professor Grobstein said that a skyhook could be called foundationalist, I did not understand what he meant, and I thought he was himself confused about this affirmation that he had made. ❋ Unknown (2009)
Besides, the kind of foundationalist arguments people like Johnson want to advance don’t really work at all, and run up against even more insurmountable problems. ❋ Unknown (2010)
Why deploy word "inerrancy" which rose basically in response to challenges of science and specifically a kind of foundationalist epistemology in Descartes and in (most ❋ Unknown (2010)
The most alarming piece of all of this is that those who read the Bible as a hard and fast foundationalist text for contemporary ethics such as the condemnation of homosexuality are often the same people who deny their reading of the Constitution is a subjective interpretation. ❋ Ben Griffith (2011)
I can't quite tell yet but perhaps you are arguing for a non-foundationalist approach to scripture; for a take on scripture such that it no longer has a constitutional function within communities of faith, or at least not in your community of faith. ❋ James F. McGrath (2010)
Descartes is often taken to be the paradigm of a classical foundationalist. ❋ Unknown (2009)
As a commited foundationalist, when reading him I was constantly jotting down objections in the margins, but as a political operative I find his skepticism about the link between epistemic/metaphysical and political positions very compelling. ❋ Unknown (2007)
Just as one needs to end epistemic regresses with foundational justification, the foundationalist will argue, so one needs to end conceptual regresses with concepts one grasps without further definition. ❋ Unknown (2009)
I suspect Rawls is operating with a less permissive and more foundationalist concept of rationality. ❋ Unknown (2007)
If a rejection of foundationalism relies on an extreme form of anti-realism so much the worse for the anti-foundationalist. ❋ Unknown (2009)
Williams is, epistemically, an anti-foundationalist but morally/ethically he still sees truth as foundational for human life. ❋ Unknown (2007)
He must be, and is, an anti-foundationalist and a fallibilist. ❋ Unknown (2009)
Q: I wonder again about when Cornel West “talks Christian”: when you mobilize that kind of language for political purposes, are you maintaining a kind of anti-foundationalist position while encouraging a foundationalism in others. ❋ Unknown (2007)
So suppose some foundationalist offers an account of noninferential justification according to which a belief is noninferentially justified if it has some characteristic X. BonJour then argues that the mere fact that the belief has X.could not, even in principle, justify the believer in holding the belief. ❋ Unknown (2009)
Bernard Williams, for example, criticizes Rorty in chapter 9 of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy from non-foundationalist grounds. ❋ Unknown (2007)
Whether you're a realist and/or foundationalist or not, whether you're a neo-Wittgensteinian pragmatist or not, whether you're an unreconstructed sense-data theorist or not, whether you're a partisan of 'naturalized epistemology' or not, justification comes to a halt either by rational necessity à la Cartesian meditation, or sheer fatigue and, frankly, sheer boredom. ❋ Unknown (2007)
Maybe I should make clear that I'm relying on a coherentist rather than a foundationalist at least in the usual ... ❋ Unknown (2009)
Why are we even discussing some kind of moral equivalency between tolerant liberals and intolerant foundationalist fanatics of whatever persuasion? ❋ Unknown (2007)
One implication of the unending nature of the interpretation of appearances through infinite sequences of signs is that Peirce can be no type of epistemological foundationalist or believer in absolute or apodeictic knowledge. ❋ Unknown (2009)
