So the challenge to the intentionalist is the following: if there is nothing about representation as such which explains the “feel” of a conscious perception, how is perception supposed to be distinguished from mere thought? ❋ Crane, Tim (2005)
(Debate on this topic has engendered a highly publicized, sometimes contrived, and increasingly arcane argument between historians in the "intentionalist" camp, who hold that from the 1920s onward Hitler intended to kill the Jews, and those in the "functionalist" camp, who argue that the Holocaust evolved piecemeal, as one set of opportunities and policies led to another.) ❋ Unknown (2004)
(sometimes "intentionalist") analysis, for Bertie to experience the green after-image is for Bertie to be visually representing a green blob located at such-and-such a spot in the room. ❋ Lycan, William (2006)
If this is to be guilty of ‘the intentionalist heresy’ I am quite content to be excommunicated for it. ❋ Unknown (2009)
In the end, I think too often the textualist/purposivist/intentionalist debate skips immediately to constitutional law, where it is arguably the least helpful (clearly, the clauses are among the broadest and vaguest courts are asked to apply and lawyers are asked to interpret), while there is little focus on how rules and legal language works out in practice, beyond the narrow realm of appellate courts. ❋ Unknown (2010)
It'll make you see "yourself" as a decentralised swarm, thus subverting the Western tradition of constructing the notions of consciousness and agency within a hierarchical, intentionalist paradigm, I imagine. ❋ Amuchmoreexotic (2008)
In the end, I think too often the textualist/purposivist/intentionalist debate skips immediately to constitutional law, where it is arguably the least helpful clearly, the clauses are among the broadest and vaguest courts are asked to apply and lawyers are asked to interpret, while there is little focus on how rules and legal language works out in practice, beyond the narrow realm of appellate courts. ❋ Unknown (2010)
On the face of it, the intentionalist appears to be able to accommodate adequately the transparency and immediacy of experience without committing to the idea that hallucinations fail to have the phenomenal character that introspective reflection suggests. ❋ Unknown (2009)
Martin argues that if the dependency thesis is correct, then the intentionalist should hold that when we visualise, we imagine a mental state (i.e., a visual experience) that represents the world to be a certain way and that has a distinctive kind of functional role. ❋ Unknown (2009)
First and foremost, Dawidowicz was an intentionalist, arguing that the murder of European Jewry was, from the beginning, the goal of Adolf Hitler. ❋ Unknown (2009)
Perhaps you are taking an intentionalist view, with the idea that common sense can unlock the intent of the legislature under the assumption that the legislature had an intent and that it would enact a sensible rule over a less sensible rule? ❋ Unknown (2009)
This might lead one to favour the intentionalist view. ❋ Unknown (2009)
Generally speaking, there are two main strands of intentionalist positions available. ❋ Unknown (2009)
According to an intentionalist account of perceptual experience, our perceptual experiences are mental events (or states) with intentional contents that represent the world as being a certain way. ❋ Unknown (2009)
He then argues that the truth of the dependency thesis should lead the intentionalist and the naïve realist to make different predictions about the phenomenology of visualising. ❋ Unknown (2009)
For example, someone who holds an intentionalist account of experience can also accept this claim. ❋ Unknown (2009)
According to Stanley Fish, no:Does it matter if judges declare themselves to be adherents of the philosophical approach or the living constitution approach or the intentionalist approach or no approach. ❋ Unknown (2008)
Fish argues that the decision was unanimously intentionalist, "the thesis that a text means what its author or authors intend." ❋ Ann Althouse (2008)
