The first of these, often referred to as internalism, holds that reasons for action must be grounded in an agent's prior motivations ❋ Wallace, R. Jay (2008)
The classic case for this kind of internalism in the contemporary literature is made by Bernard Williams in his 1980 paper “Internal and External Reasons”. ❋ Lenman, James (2009)
She takes herself to be following feminist theorists such as Carol Gilligan and Margaret Urban Walker in examining moral issues, including that of the internalism/externalism debate, as they present themselves in richly detailed concrete situations, which, she believes, makes her account feminist (p. 71). ❋ Superson, Anita (2009)
More recently Williams 'internalism is attacked by Derek Parfit who places a heavy emphasis on a distinction between motivating reasons and normative reasons and urges that the credibility of internalism depends on confusing the two (Parfit 1997, 2007). ❋ Lenman, James (2009)
Although feminists have not addressed the problems for feminism related to agent internalism, at least two feminists have identified problems with internalism in general, as a logical thesis about the connection between motives and reasons and/or obligations. ❋ Superson, Anita (2009)
She is suggesting that, contra internalism, it is possible to make a moral judgment yet fail to be appropriately motivated, due to sexist influences; sexism can make us unaware of a moral demand or unresponsive to it. ❋ Superson, Anita (2009)
These claims we could call respectively normative and moral judgement internalism. ❋ Lenman, James (2009)
Nelson rejects the standard view of internalism as a logical connection between belief and motivation, in favor of the view that internalism reflects the degrees to which a person grasps moral beliefs and to which she acts on these beliefs. ❋ Superson, Anita (2009)
An early critic of Williams is E.J. Bond in his book Reason and Value (1983) where he urges, echoing Frankena's earlier critique of internalism, that Williams 'argument is undermined if we distinguish clearly between what he calls motivating reasons and grounding reasons. ❋ Lenman, James (2009)
According to one version of internalism, which David Brink calls “agent internalism,” in virtue of the concept of morality, moral obligations (or moral reasons, on a two-step internalism linking obligations, reasons, and motives) necessarily motivate the agent to act morally (see Brink 1986, 28). ❋ Superson, Anita (2009)
He takes internalism and externalism to be points on a scale registering the relationship between an agent and the moral understandings considered authoritative in her moral-social world. ❋ Superson, Anita (2009)
Second, on the other version of internalism described above, if the agent fails to be motivated by a moral reason, the agent still has the reason but is irrational (Smith 1994; Korsgaard 1996). ❋ Superson, Anita (2009)
Here we could speak of moral existence internalism and externalism. ❋ Lenman, James (2009)
Two issues relating to the internalism/externalism debate bear on women's oppression. ❋ Superson, Anita (2009)
Because sophisticated consequentialists agree that motivation out of friendship must be personal, they must reject the idea that the ultimate moral reasons for acting in these cases are your motives, thereby rejecting the relatively weak motivational internalism that is implicit in the friendship critique (for weak motivational internalism, see the entry on moral cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism, and in particular the section on motivational internalism and the action-guiding character of moral judgements). ❋ Helm, Bennett (2009)
If internalism in its various guises fails to generate an adequate account of the justification of memory belief, then we should consider externalism. ❋ Senor, Thomas D. (2009)
First, on agent internalism, if the agent lacks the relevant motivation, the agent does not have a reason to act morally (see Brink 1986, 29). ❋ Superson, Anita (2009)
The Long Shot uses short, sharp, direct sentences that hit you like a flurry of unending jabs that effectively strikes a perfect balance between external action and internalism. ❋ Unknown (2009)
Sometimes “internalism” is used in a somewhat different sense to mean that facts about moral obligation are tied essentially to the motivational condition of those supposedly obligated and externalism as the denial of this claim. ❋ Lenman, James (2009)
Generally stated, internalism is the view that there is a logical or necessary connection between two concepts, typically reasons, motives, and obligations. ❋ Superson, Anita (2009)
