Interservice

The Burke documents date from internal Navy and interservice memoranda arguing the merits of each leg of the triad. ❋ Ron Rosenbaum (2011)

Also in 1947, building on the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff as a mechanism for interservice cooperation, a single Department of Defense, responsible for overseeing all activities of the armed forces and reporting directly to the White House, was established. ❋ Col. Matthew Moten (2011)

Because of interservice rivalry, the Army sent FDR reports from Magic on odd-numbered months, the Navy sent them on the even-numbered ones. ❋ Douglas Waller (2011)

Popular and institutional memories also ignored the real operational lessons of Plattsburgh: the strategic resilience of a professional army when supported by an expansible militia; the necessity of close interservice cooperation; and the necessity for expeditionary-capable logistical support when operating in lightly populated wilderness. ❋ Col. Matthew Moten (2011)

A lack of translators, unfamiliarity with interservice protocol and different approaches to decision making are among the problems that have slowed down the pace, they say. ❋ Chester Dawson (2011)

Outcomes of the British efforts to dictate overall strategic pressure were the self-protective attempts at interservice cooperation that resulted in the creation of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the principal continuing mechanism for British-American wartime coordination, the Combined Chiefs of Staff CCS organization. ❋ Col. Matthew Moten (2011)

Certainly today, when interservice joint operations are not only common but necessary, the 1944–45 effort begs for detailed attention. ❋ Barrett Tillman (2010)

They tended to bog down in interservice disputes over specifications, budget battles between and within the services, and cultural clashes between institutions with different needs, different priorities, different ways of doing things, and unique internal politics. ❋ Richard Whittle (2010)

One was a restructuring Congress imposed on the armed services to foster “jointness”—cooperation among the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marines—instead of the interservice rivalry and insularity that had characterized their relations forever. ❋ Richard Whittle (2010)

But such was military secrecy and interservice rivalry that even late in the war few Japanese knew the origin of the device that appeared on downed Allied aircraft. ❋ Barrett Tillman (2010)

If interservice rivalry constituted a “second front” in Washington, D.C., it was a full contact sport in Tokyo. ❋ Barrett Tillman (2010)

Yet an enduring question is why Tokyo squandered more than two years after the Doolittle Raid, and why so little interservice coordination was attempted once B-29s appeared in homeland skies. ❋ Barrett Tillman (2010)

The next priority was an officers club, which was constructed with the same interservice negotiations that attended procurement of the ice machine. ❋ Barrett Tillman (2010)