Nonmoral

And if that is true for Moore-paradoxical moral sentences, it should also go for Moore-paradoxical nonmoral sentences. ❋ Unknown (2009)

The basic idea here is that conditionals with moral antecedents and nonmoral consequents should, together with the moral judgment in the antecedent, license acceptance of the consequent. ❋ Unknown (2009)

On this proposal the norms would be needed to represent the contents of the realist's thought because different realist theories might have the moral properties supervene on different nonmoral properties and a person could be a realist without being committed to the truth of any particular realist theory. ❋ Unknown (2009)

Full and vivid awareness of relevant nonmoral facts. ❋ Unknown (2009)

We find it hard to imagine what agreement on nonmoral facts could do the trick, for we can readily imagine that northerners and southerners might be in full agreement on the relevant nonmoral facts in the cases described. ❋ Unknown (2009)

Blackburn thinks that we require such an explanation even if there are metaphysically or nomically necessary connections between moral and nonmoral terms or properties. ❋ Unknown (2009)

According to Blackburn, it is not just the simple fact that moral properties supervene on nonmoral properties that needs to be explained. ❋ Unknown (2009)

Take a version of expressivism which says that a moral judgment that such and such an action is wrong predicates a nonmoral property of that action and at the same time expresses disapproval of that property. ❋ Unknown (2009)

It is of course possible that full and vivid awareness of the nonmoral facts might motivate the sort of change in southern attitudes envisaged by the (at least the northern) moral realist. ❋ Unknown (2009)

Moral realists have argued that moral disagreements very often derive from disagreement about nonmoral issues. ❋ Unknown (2009)

(Jeske (2008) argues for a somewhat different conclusion: that in order to heal this apparent split between impartial moral obligations and the partial obligations of friendship, we must abandon the distinction between moral and nonmoral obligations.) ❋ Helm, Bennett (2009)

But this is of little help for the expedient under consideration, since the disagreement-in-nonmoral-fact response apparently requires that one can disentangle factual and moral disagreement. ❋ Unknown (2009)

Nor is it just that appropriate moral predication must supervene on nonmoral predication, to put the point in a way that does not beg the question against non-cognitivism. ❋ Unknown (2009)

With this sort of difficulty in mind, Brandt (1954) undertook his own anthropological study of Hopi peoples in the American southwest, and found issues for which there appeared to be serious moral disagreement between typical Hopi and white American attitudes that could not plausibly be attributed to differences in belief about nonmoral facts. ❋ Unknown (2009)

It is rather to explain how honoring the supervenience constraint can be a requirement of linguistic competence, even while there is no analytic entailment from nonmoral claims to moral claims. ❋ Unknown (2009)

While Houston agrees with the feminist intention to reclaim womanly virtues as virtues in the face of their absence from contemporary moral theory, she cautions that these virtues, including care, should win the liberation of women, make women's subordination a primary moral concern, make it a recognizable moral problem rather than a nonmoral matter, challenge the status quo of women's social position, and not further women's oppression (p. 255). ❋ Superson, Anita (2009)

A second, the dorsolateral (upper and outer-facing) surface of the frontal lobes, has been implicated in ongoing mental computation (including nonmoral reasoning, like deciding whether to get somewhere by plane or train). ❋ Unknown (2008)

In this century, R.M. Hare, in his earlier books (The Language of M.rals, Freedom and Reason) regarded moral judgments as those judgments that override all nonmoral judgments and that the person would universalize. ❋ Gert, Bernard (2008)

However, on ethical or group relativist accounts or on individualistic accounts, apart from avoiding and preventing harm, morality has no special content or features that distinguishes it from nonmoral codes of conduct, such as law or religion. ❋ Gert, Bernard (2008)

But this position makes it hard to see how justice can be a virtue; for it is hard to find the requisite natural, nonmoral motive for it. ❋ Denis, Lara (2008)