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which one of the following will execute faster? int p = 2; p++; OR p = p+1; OR p+ = 1; and y?? is it p++ bcoz it is a single instruction?? ... nd the rest r multiple ... ❋ Priyanka.js28 (2010)

Now, assume that a given sentence, s, corresponds to the fact that p; and assume that ˜p™ and ˜q™ are sentences with the same truth-value. ❋ David, Marian (2009)

Where p is a permutation of objects on a domain D, we can define the p-transform function p* as follows: if x is an object in D, p* (x) = ❋ MacFarlane, John (2009)

One can believe p and believe ~p without believing ❋ Deweese-Boyd, Ian (2008)

Traditionally, self-deception has been modeled on interpersonal deception, where A intentionally gets B to believe some proposition p, all the while knowing or believing truly ~p. ❋ Deweese-Boyd, Ian (2008)

Mele (2001), drawing on empirical research regarding lay hypothesis testing, argues that selectivity may be explained in terms of the agent's assessment of the relative costs of erroneously believing p and ~p. ❋ Deweese-Boyd, Ian (2008)

If we say that p is true if and only if it coheres with a specified set of propositions, we may be asked about the truth conditions of ˜p coheres with a specified set.™ ❋ Young, James O. (2008)

Condition (3) is meant to prevent this situation; if p is false, the true belief that ~p can be added to ❋ Reed, Baron (2008)

On such deflationary views of self-deception, one need only hold a false belief p, possess evidence that ~p, and have some desire or emotion that explains why p is believed and retained. ❋ Deweese-Boyd, Ian (2008)

The first-order language under consideration has a 1-place predicate symbol p* corresponding to each ordinary propositional symbol p of modal logic, a 2-place predicate symbol R, and a 2-place predicate symbol =. ❋ Braüner, Torben (2008)

In general, if one possesses evidence that one normally would take to support ~p and yet believes p instead due to some desire, emotion or other motivation one has related to ❋ Deweese-Boyd, Ian (2008)

It is the relative subjective costs of falsely believing p and ~p that explains why desire or other motivation biases belief in some circumstances and not others. ❋ Deweese-Boyd, Ian (2008)

If Row and Column cooperate with probabilities p and q (and defect with probabilities p* = 1-p and q* = 1-q), for example, then the expected value of the payoff to Row is p*qT+pqR+p*q*P+pq*S. ❋ Kuhn, Steven (2007)

The second says it is not ruled out by anything our agent does that p if and only if our agent does not bring it about that ~p. ❋ McNamara, Paul (2006)

PVp is consistent with its being fixed that p and consistent with its being fixed that ~p, as long as it is not fixed by anything our agent has done. ❋ McNamara, Paul (2006)

Here we can properly express the fact that she is positively obligated to be non-agential with respect to the status of both p and ~p. ❋ McNamara, Paul (2006)

The first says that it is ruled out by what our agent does that p if and only if our agent brings it about that ~p. ❋ McNamara, Paul (2006)

So in Kd, p is obligatory iff p is necessitated by all normative demands being met, permissible iff p is compatible with all normative demands being met, impermissible iff p is incompatible with all normative demands, gratuitous iff p's negation is compatible with all normative demands, and optional iff p is compatible with all normative demands, and so is ~p. ❋ McNamara, Paul (2006)

Wouldn't it be plausible to conclude that, since that person's reliability is unknown to you, that person's saying ˜p™ does not put you in a position to know that p? ❋ Steup, Matthias (2005)

To see that, note that (~h & p) as well as (~h & ~p) are contraries of h, and that it is not possible for both ~ (~h & p) and ~ (~h & ~p) to be true and h to be false. ❋ Klein, Peter (2005)