However, to this challenge it might be replied that it misconceives how (P3) is to be interpreted: (P3), it may be said, is not intended to apply to properties understood as universals, but only to so-called particularised properties (otherwise variously known as property instances, individual accidents, tropes, or modes). ❋ Lowe, E. Jonathan (2009)
Simon Singh has not only pleaded these two defences, he has over eight pages and 32 paragraphs "particularised" them, that is set out the building blocks in support. ❋ Jack Of Kent (2008)
"Our revels now are ended" becomes not a glowing cosmic recital but a particularised vision of the fragility of mortal things. ❋ Unknown (2011)
Recall that particularised properties are conceived of as property instances, such as the particular redness of a certain apple. ❋ Lowe, E. Jonathan (2009)
We may be inclined to endorse the strategy just outlined: that is, to maintain that if indeed there are such things as essential particularised properties that are ˜possessed™ by substances, then they are in fact to be identified with those substances, whence they constitute no threat to (SUB). ❋ Lowe, E. Jonathan (2009)
Moreover, substances quite generally do not depend for their identity upon their (accidental) particularised properties, if such exist, nor upon the events in which they participate, nor upon the places they occupy, nor upon other substances. ❋ Lowe, E. Jonathan (2009)
The only ones that get burned by a reversal are the judges that wrote the original opinion, and the insult to their egos can hardly offset the actual injury to later parties with a particularised and concrete interest in the outcome of their own case. ❋ Unknown (2007)
On this interpretation, (P3) has considerable plausibility, complying as it does with the intuition that particularised properties cannot ❋ Lowe, E. Jonathan (2009)
For although too little is independently known about essential particularised properties to dispute an identity between them and the substances possessing them, other cases are more problematic. ❋ Lowe, E. Jonathan (2009)
(Actually, (P3) itself does not quite imply this, although it does imply that a particularised property cannot migrate from one object to another when the first object ceases to exist.) ❋ Lowe, E. Jonathan (2009)
For if y is an essential particularised property of a substance x, it will apparently be the case that there is something non-identical with x, namely y, such that, necessarily, x exists only if y exists: and this conflicts with x's status as a substance according to ❋ Lowe, E. Jonathan (2009)
But perhaps we can deny that this particularised humanity is anything distinct from ❋ Lowe, E. Jonathan (2009)
(The only admissible exception would be in the case of essential particularised properties of substances, but these, we have suggested, may be identified with the substances themselves.) ❋ Lowe, E. Jonathan (2009)
It can be tempting to read this debate as one with a narrow relevance, of a dispute over the merely particularised traditional law of the Jews and so of little relevance to our concerns, those of the moral law in general. ❋ Tusar N Mohapatra (2009)
Of course, an apple can change its colour, so that this is not an example of an essential particularised property of the apple. ❋ Lowe, E. Jonathan (2009)
How can we accommodate the possibility that some, at least, of the particularised properties of a substance (assuming such particularised properties to exist) are essential to it? ❋ Lowe, E. Jonathan (2009)
Now, what could be a plausible example of an essential particularised property of an individual substance, say Socrates? ❋ Lowe, E. Jonathan (2009)
Instead, the "picturesque in action" strives to place the observer in the position of the participant, moving through a landscape that may be peopled with historically particularised figures, up close to the action. ❋ Unknown (2006)
