One of the main motivations behind the perceptual/representational views of pain in philosophy is the belief (or hope) that perception as a species of information gathering can be accounted for entirely in physicalistic terms. ❋ Aydede, Murat (2009)
Another problem with physicalistic views along the lines of Mill's is that they seem incapable of accounting for the sheer size of the infinities involved in set theory. ❋ Balaguer, Mark (2009)
But in fact, there are infinitely many different kinds of set-theoretic structures, and platonists can argue that physicalistic views like Maddy's are incompatible with this. ❋ Balaguer, Mark (2009)
Thirdly, he writes that his ideas were the same as Avenarius who had approached questions of the relationship between the psychical and the physical from a physicalistic perspective. ❋ Pojman, Paul (2009)
The “inverted” and “absent” qualia objections were initially presented as challenges exclusively to functionalist theories, both conceptual and empirical, and not generally to physicalistic theories of experiential states; the main concern was that the purely relational resources of functional description were incapable of capturing the intrinsic qualitative character of states such as feeling pain, or seeing red. ❋ Levin, Janet (2009)
There are numerous problems with physicalistic views of mathematics. ❋ Balaguer, Mark (2008)
Most current work in the philosophy of mind presupposes physicalism, and it is generally agreed that a physicalistic theory that does not simply deny the reality of the mental (that is not an “eliminativist” theory), raises metaphysical questions. ❋ Van Inwagen, Peter (2007)
Flohr's approach is physicalistic and reductionistic, but it is entirely independent of any specific quantum ideas. ❋ Atmanspacher, Harald (2006)
All along Carnap (1932e, 1961a) merely conceded that it was more “convenient” to reconstruct the language of science on a physicalistic basis. ❋ Uebel, Thomas (2006)
Page 548, Volume 3 basis for reconstruction (already briefly discussed as one of several possible alternatives in the Aufbau): the language that would provide for the “unity of science” in this sense was to be the (“physicalistic”) intersubjec - tive observation language. ❋ HERBERT FEIGL (1968)
The traditional mind-body problems thus came to the fore again, having been almost completely suppressed during the reign of (first) phenomenalistic and (later) behavioristic-physicalistic trends of thought. ❋ HERBERT FEIGL (1968)
But his preference remained for a view accord - ing to which the mentalistic language of immediate experience would be supplanted by a physicalistic language. ❋ HERBERT FEIGL (1968)
Whereas animals survive by means of a physicalistic characteristics as size, strength, footspeed, wings, etc., man has no similar abilities. ❋ Unknown (2010)
(b) are not reducible to physicalistic predicates. ❋ Robinson, Howard (2007)
(regardless of whether one describes them in mentalistic terms) while rejecting the seeming consequence that mental goings-on can be given purely physical explanations (precisely because only a physicalistic vocabulary is suited to such an explanation, so that it is only under its physical description that a mental event can be seen to enter into causal relations) [Nagel 1965, Davidson 1970, 1993]. ❋ Casati, Roberto (2006)
And, second, there is the physicalistic view that belief reports involve references to external sentence tokens, i.e., to piles of ink, and so on (versions of this view have been endorsed by Carnap ❋ Balaguer, Mark (2009)
Though neither Nagel (2000) nor Jackson (1998) now endorse this argument, many philosophers contend that it raises special problems for any physicalistic view (see Alter 2007, and, in response, Jackson ❋ Levin, Janet (2009)
a result, the physicalistic method of analyzing the mind tends to interpret psychic reality in an idiom which, when it refers to neural processes, risks becoming gratuitously indirect and obscure, and, when it refers to public behavior, fails to express what is given phenomenologically in consciousness. ❋ ARAM VARTANIAN (1968)
“mentalistic” propositions as “physicalistic” proposi - tions. ❋ ARAM VARTANIAN (1968)
So [this guy] is [a douche] to you but you still like him because he's gorgeous? Wow, you are so [physicalistic]... ❋ Pepe454 (2011)
