Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm ordeath. ❋ Unknown (2009)
In context, the Court was attempting to distinguish between instances where content-based regulation of a subcategory of otherwise proscribable speech is unconstitutional as in the St. Paul ordinance at issue from those where “a particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech.” ❋ Unknown (2009)
If, on the other hand, Defendants mean that all speech that offends this definition is necessarily proscribable as sexually derogatory fighting words, then we reject this argument as an unwarranted and unconstitutional enlargement of what constitutes fighting words. ❋ Unknown (2009)
The specific speech for which plaintiff was prosecuted contains no constitutionally proscribable speech. ❋ FIRSTAMENDMENT (2010)
Defendants cite no authority for the proposition that truthful lawfully-obtained, publicly - available personal identifying information constitutes a mode of constitutionally proscribable speech. ❋ FIRSTAMENDMENT (2010)
Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death. ❋ FIRSTAMENDMENT (2010)
This suggests that in the Washington statute, the “basis for the content discrimination [within the unprotected category] consists entirely of the very reason [or, here, reasons] the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable”: The law is punishing statements that are especially dangerous to public discussion (since they are about elections, where sound decisionmaking is especially important, and a decision must be made by the election day, so falsehoods may therefore be especially damaging), and that are especially likely to hurt a particular person (which explains the exception for false statements about yourself). ❋ Unknown (2007)
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), that “since words can in some circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but against conduct (a law against treason, for example, is violated by telling the enemy the Nation’s defense secrets), a particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidently within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech.” ❋ Unknown (2009)
It’s not the case that “the basis for the content discrimination [deceased soldiers’ names vs. others’ names] consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue [speech that uses others’ names without permission] is proscribable.” ❋ Unknown (2007)
"But in the recent 'Bong Hits 4 Jesus' case, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that student speech is 'proscribable because it is plainly' offensive. ' ❋ Unknown (2010)
Case 4: 09-cv-00373-RS-WCS Document 42 Filed 01/29/10 Page 6 of 27 knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction "- are generally proscribable under the First Amendment. ❋ FIRSTAMENDMENT (2010)
The [proscribe](s) got [Epsteined] before the feces hit the fan, that way their voice was silenced before they felt the need to [raise it] any more.
Susan sucks ass! Always bringing up shit that kills the vibe. Yea, fuck her! She's a proscribe. We all know the UN wouldn't lie about the events that took place on 9/11 or viruses ❋ AfkProscribe (2021)
[Oh boy] Jerry! I proscribed that [jawnski] down [the block] last night man! ❋ The Almighty Reezy (2017)
