Qualia

The language used for the qualia is applied to the theoretical description. ❋ M_francis (2009)

The word qualia accounts for the subjective sensation experienced by a person when they see a color or eat an ice cream.

Despite detailed understanding of neuronal firings and synaptic transmissions mediating non-conscious cognitive functions, there is no accounting for conscious awareness, free will or 'qualia' - the essence of experienced perceptions, like the redness, texture and fragrance of a rose. ❋ Unknown (2010)

Despite detailed understanding of neuronal firings and synaptic transmissions mediating non-conscious, 'auto-pilot' perception and behaviors, there is no accounting for conscious awareness, free will or 'qualia' - the essence of experienced perceptions, like the redness, texture and fragrance of a rose. ❋ Unknown (2010)

The knowledge argument points out that there are things about mental states - subjective experience called 'qualia' - that are knowledge that is not material. ❋ Unknown (2009)

The main argument against physicalism is usually thought to concern the notion of qualia, the felt qualities of experience. ❋ Stoljar, Daniel (2009)

BTW, the recognition that there are perceptual spaces, and that our so-called qualia are relational, does away with such dualistic nonsense as inverted spectra that assumes attributes of experience that are independent of any physical fact about the experiencer. ❋ Unknown (2006)

I have written several posts about qualia, which is the subjective nature of sensory experiences, such the experience of the color red, or the smell of coffee, or the 'hurt' of pain. ❋ Unknown (2009)

It is Brahman, the quantum field, or spacetime geometry which includes 'qualia', the sights, sounds, and textures of the world. ❋ Unknown (2010)

To account for the 'hard problem', the nature of experience, Penrose and Hameroff asserted that 'qualia', the components of conscious experience, are fundamental and irreducible components of reality, like electron spin, charge and mass - all derived from the omnipresent matrix of fundamental spacetime geometry at the Planck scale. ❋ Unknown (2010)

Chalmers promulgated the point that the "qualia" of conscious experience are not reducible to matter. ❋ Unknown (2007)

Thought Provoker, in that previous thread, no, I did not mean 'qualia'. ❋ Unknown (2007)

You have identified one of the primary points of contention in the science and philosophy of mind, usually argued interminably between the die-hard materialists and those who believe that experiential states (such as qualia, freedom of will, etc.) are real. ❋ Unknown (2005)

Qualitative features of mental states are often called "qualia" ❋ Lycan, William (2006)

Harman precisely denies the existence of mental paint, but Block holds that, in particular, he can introspect the nonintentional, nonfunctional items that he calls "qualia" in a sense quite different from our own. ❋ Lycan, William (2006)

For reasons that will become clear, we may call this sense of "qualia" the ❋ Lycan, William (2006)