This is also talked about by some as a "reliabilist" epistemology. ❋ Unknown (2006)
The lesson, the reliabilist will tell us, is that the justificatory status of a memory belief is, in standard cases, partially a function of the belief's justificatory status at an earlier time. ❋ Senor, Thomas D. (2009)
That the reliabilist is concerned with avoiding the conceptual regress is clear from the fact that the analysis offered is explicitly recursive. ❋ Unknown (2009)
So will the reliabilist believe that the justificatory status of a belief earlier is irrelevant to its status as a memory belief? ❋ Senor, Thomas D. (2009)
The reliabilist actually accepts the first clause of PIJ, but avoids both the epistemic and conceptual regresses by embracing a kind of justified belief that does not owe its justification to the having of other different justified beliefs. ❋ Unknown (2009)
So a reliabilist will hold that a memory belief is justified only if the memorial process that maintains it is reliable and if it was justified when originally formed. ❋ Senor, Thomas D. (2009)
But the sketch is enough to bring out the foundationalist structure inherent in a reliabilist account. ❋ Unknown (2009)
The reliabilist will think of memory as what Alvin Goldman has called a “belief-dependent process” ❋ Senor, Thomas D. (2009)
If I'm wondering whether or not I have justification to believe that God exists, I'm hardly going to think that my question has been answered when I'm told by the reliabilist that I might have a reliably produced belief that God exists or when I'm told by the causal theorist that my belief that God exists might be caused by the very fact that God exists. ❋ Unknown (2009)
A basic historical reliabilist will say that a belief is justified just in case it has been produced by a process that has yielded a preponderance of true beliefs. ❋ Reed, Baron (2008)
Some rationalists think that a reliabilist account of warrant provides the answer. ❋ Markie, Peter (2008)
Consequently, people's general competence with logical notions may not in fact consist in any grip on valid logical rules; and so whatever rules do underlie that competence may well turn out not to be the kind of absolutely reliable guide to the world on which the above reliabilist defense of a priori analytic knowledge seems to depend. ❋ Rey, Georges (2008)
Some theories of knowledge that are principally known by different labels nevertheless embed reliabilist elements. ❋ Goldman, Alvin (2008)
This position runs quite contrary to traditional reliabilism, but he views it as having a reliabilist flavor because evidence for reliability is what matters. ❋ Goldman, Alvin (2008)
So in the scenarios in question, a reliabilist would say that subjects are justified in believing that their perceptual beliefs are not justified even though, in fact, they are justified. ❋ Goldman, Alvin (2008)
He rejects the assumption that the process reliabilist must pick out a single epistemically relevant process type for any given token. ❋ Goldman, Alvin (2008)
Such a reliabilist approach, though, might be less than fully satisfying to someone interested in the traditional a priori analytic. ❋ Rey, Georges (2008)
Let us turn now to reliabilist approaches to justification, especially process reliabilism. ❋ Goldman, Alvin (2008)
For example, it is surely open to the reliabilist to argue that the greater instrumental value of reliable true belief over mere true belief does not need to be understood purely in terms of instrumental value relative to the good of true belief. ❋ Pritchard, Duncan (2007)
With this point in mind, Brady's central thesis is that on the reliabilist account knowledge is more valuable than true belief because certain active positive evaluative attitudes are fitting only with regard to the former (i.e., reliable true belief). ❋ Pritchard, Duncan (2007)
