Sense Data

Now, if I were a phenomenalist, I would rewrite that title as, "Do that which will produce the sense data you interpret as 'moving north,' or else experience the sense-data -- followed by the immediate cessation thereof -- you would interpret as 'being eaten.'" ❋ Unknown (2010)

Aesthetics doesn't originate with the subject, but it isn't anything intrinsic in the object perceived, either — it is, instead, the mind's reaction to an influx of sense-data that's too much to think about all at once. ❋ Matthew Guerrieri (2009)

And he is best known for criticising Ayer's sense-data version of anti-realism about physical objects on the basis that Ayer misunderstands how words are actually used. ❋ Unknown (2007)

In fact, this move would also work for visual sense-data that require some spatiotemporal framework. ❋ Aydede, Murat (2009)

According to sense-datum theorists, sense-data are internal to one's consciousness: they are not before one's sense-organs. ❋ Aydede, Murat (2009)

Furthermore, even when one might successfully get rid of mysterious mental objects like sense-data with this adverbialist move, it is not clear whether adverbialism might still lead to a form of property dualism according to which one is directly aware of certain (non-physical) phenomenological qualities instantiated by experiences realized by brain states. ❋ Aydede, Murat (2009)

This is a very complicated election -- complicated by the presence of and reaction (by the electorate) to the media's own narratives, complicated by events that are in no ways foreseeable (Clinton's stellar performances on Monday), complicated by the fact that we are emotional beings who react to constellations of sense-data. ❋ Unknown (2009)

By contrast, 'thought' or 'experience' or 'sense-data' are experienced directly. ❋ Unknown (2007)

A poorly made case that non-human animals process sense-data in similar ways to autistic ones. ❋ Unknown (2007)

As pointed out earlier, early direct realists played down the importance of experiential phenomenology and sometimes even denied its existence fearing that acknowledging it will lead to the introduction of sense-data or ❋ Aydede, Murat (2009)

That's why they lock up people who sincerely disbelieve in moral value, but they don't lock up Berkeleyan idealists, sense-data theorists, Hegelian idealists, phenomenologists, etc, etc, etc. ❋ Unknown (2007)

Both sorts of arguments tend to be general arguments not directly related to pain, so we won't cover them here (but see the entry on sense-data). ❋ Aydede, Murat (2009)

But sense-data are not supposed to have an independent existence, and therefore the very conception of a sense-datum involves a contradiction. ❋ Dancy, Jonathan (2009)

Ordinary terms such as 'table', 'tree', 'horse', etc, argues Austin, really do refer to tables, trees, and horses, and not to their associated subjective sense-data. ❋ Unknown (2007)

Desires, in Thompson's Sellarsian view, are a mistake on a par with sense-data; just as the sense-datum theorist treats a linguistic device for hedging one's commitments (“It appears to be ¦”) as naming a psychological state (a mere appearance), so the Humean theorist of practical rationality is treating a linguistic device for sorting out the order of subsidiary actions ❋ Millgram, Elijah (2009)

Whether you're a realist and/or foundationalist or not, whether you're a neo-Wittgensteinian pragmatist or not, whether you're an unreconstructed sense-data theorist or not, whether you're a partisan of 'naturalized epistemology' or not, justification comes to a halt either by rational necessity à la Cartesian meditation, or sheer fatigue and, frankly, sheer boredom. ❋ Unknown (2007)

Such events as experiences, and such entities as sense-data, when they are not already understood in the framework of observable phenomena ordinarily recognized, are theoretical entities. ❋ Arlene Ang (2009)