But regardless of how long the notion of supervenience has been around, or who first used the term ˜supervenience™ in its philosophical sense, it is indisputable that Donald Davidson played a key role in bringing the idea to center stage. ❋ McLaughlin, Brian (2005)
Jaegwon Kim (1984, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1993), David Lewis (1983), and others began to examine the notion of supervenience itself, and to explore its usefulness for a wide variety of philosophical purposes. ❋ McLaughlin, Brian (2005)
A somewhat less restrictive view than reductionism is the theory of "supervenience" between levels of scientific description. ❋ Daniel Little (2008)
Fs. (61) SFN transformations assert a kind of supervenience condition on Fs: if the relevant non-F conditions obtain, Fs exist and have the relevant features. ❋ McGrath, Matthew (2007)
"supervenience" goes back to G. E.Moore's work on ethics. ❋ Unknown (2008)
"supervenience", mind-brain identity, epiphenomenalism, or simply denying that mental or other non-physical events can be causes. ❋ Unknown (2008)
The idea of supervenience might be introduced via an example due to David Lewis of a dot-matrix picture: ❋ Stoljar, Daniel (2009)
Even on that assumption, however, it is still not completely obvious that supervenience physicalism entails type physicalism. ❋ Stoljar, Daniel (2009)
If supervenience physicalism is true, it will then be true that: ❋ Stoljar, Daniel (2009)
To use the language of supervenience, just as the global features of the picture supervene on the dots, so too everything supervenes on the physical, if physicalism is true. ❋ Stoljar, Daniel (2009)
While reductionistic understandings agree that supervenience occurs, reductionistic supervenience maintains that there are consistent principles that function in the same way at both levels. ❋ Culp, John (2009)
On some assumptions concerning closure and supervenience, supervenience physicalism (construed as a necessary truth) entails type physicalism; on other assumptions, it doesn't. ❋ Stoljar, Daniel (2009)
A different suggestion has been made by Melnyk (2003), who argues that physicalism should be defined not in terms of supervenience but in terms of a different relation, realization. ❋ Stoljar, Daniel (2009)
All supervenience says is that if a world is a minimal physical duplicate of the actual world, it is a duplicate simpliciter. ❋ Stoljar, Daniel (2009)
In order to answer this question it is worth comparing and contrasting supervenience physicalism with two alternative statements of physicalism that one finds in the literature: token and type physicalism. ❋ Stoljar, Daniel (2009)
If we assume that abstract objects, if they exist, exist necessarily, i.e., exist in all possible worlds, then supervenience physicalism is completely silent on the question of whether abstract objects exist. ❋ Stoljar, Daniel (2009)
The problem seems to be that the supervenience definition of physicalism in effect presupposes something like Hume's dictum, in that it uses failure of necessitation as a test for distinctness. ❋ Stoljar, Daniel (2009)
