The discussion so far may suggest that whether the notion of transworld identity (that an object exists in more than one world) is problematic depends solely on whether one adopts an account of possible worlds as concrete entities such as Lewis's (in which case it is) or an account of possible worlds as abstract entities such as Plantinga's (in which case it is not). ❋ Mackie, Penelope (2006)
Submissions should be emailed to: pratchettprize@transworld-publishers.co.uk ❋ Neth (2010)
Helen Edwards: e-mail: H.Edwards@transworld-publishers.co.uk phone: 020 8579 3652 ❋ Lou Anders (2009)
A good discussion of the whole problem of transworld identity can be found in Mackie 2008. ❋ Feldman, Richard (2008)
To recapitulate: the natural extension of the possible-worlds interpretation to de re modal statements involves a commitment to the view that some individuals exist in more than one possible world, and thus to what is known as ˜identity across possible worlds™, or (for short) ˜transworld identity™. ❋ Mackie, Penelope (2006)
If the transworld identity theorist were a Lewisian realist about possible worlds, this notion of existence in a world could be clearly distinguished from the neutral notion of existence according to a world, on the grounds that the existence of Russell in a world would require his complete or partial presence as a part of such a world (cf. Section 1.2 above). ❋ Mackie, Penelope (2006)
Throughout this article, it has been assumed that a commitment to transworld identity may be differentiated from a commitment to counterpart theory on the grounds that the transworld identity theorist accepts, while the counterpart theorist denies, that an object exists in more than one possible world (cf. Section 1.2 above). ❋ Mackie, Penelope (2006)
Thus much discussion in this area has concerned the comparative merits of the transworld identity and counterpart-theoretic accounts as interpretations, within a possible-worlds framework, of statements of what is possible and necessary for particular individuals. ❋ Mackie, Penelope (2006)
To know what a claim of transworld identity amounts to, and whether such claims are acceptable, we need to know what a possible world is, and what it is for an individual to exist in one. ❋ Mackie, Penelope (2006)
As far as I am aware, no aficionado of transworld identity has attempted to reply to this challenge. ❋ Mackie, Penelope (2006)
The fact that, in the absence of non-trivial individual essences, a transworld identity characterization of de re modal statements appears to generate bare identities (via arguments such as Chisholm's Paradox or Forbes's reduplication argument) may produce a variety of reactions. ❋ Mackie, Penelope (2006)
However, one central issue was whether the claim that an individual exists in more than one possible world (and hence that there are cases of transworld identity) needs to be backed by the provision of criteria of transworld identity, and, if so, why. ❋ Mackie, Penelope (2006)
In other words, to say that there is a transworld identity is to say that the same object exists in distinct possible worlds, or (more simply) that some object exists in more than one possible world. ❋ Mackie, Penelope (2006)
If so, the proponent of transworld identity (as opposed to counterpart theory) appears to be left with two options: the denial of the tolerance principle, and the acceptance of bare identities, although it may be argued that the acceptance of bare identities can be made more palatable in such a case by the adoption of a non-transitive accessibility relation between possible worlds. ❋ Mackie, Penelope (2006)
The view that an individual's transworld identity is ❋ Mackie, Penelope (2006)
Is ˜the problem of transworld identity™ a pseudo-problem? ❋ Mackie, Penelope (2006)
And some regard bare identities as too high a price to pay for the characterization of de re modal statements in terms of transworld identity. ❋ Mackie, Penelope (2006)
However, even if all three of these assumptions can be dismissed as bad, or at least inadequate, reasons for supposing that transworld identity requires criteria of transworld identity (and hence for supposing that there is a problem of transworld identity), it does not follow that there are no good reasons for this supposition. ❋ Mackie, Penelope (2006)
Finally, it can be noted that the problems concerning transworld identity discussed here arise only because it is assumed that not all of an individual's properties are essential to it (and hence that, if it exists in more than one possible world, it has different properties in different worlds). ❋ Mackie, Penelope (2006)
TJ: dood, peep this sick snowboarding video. Lucas Magoon is so cool.
[Buschy]: stupid [transworlder]... [gay alert]. ❋ Pokorny (2009)
