Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a manifest contradiction, for to have an idea is all one as to perceive; that therefore wherein colour, figure, and the like qualities exist must perceive them; hence it is clear there can be no unthinking substance or substratum of those ideas. ❋ Unknown (2006)
But, say you, though it be granted that there is no thoughtless support of extension and the other qualities or accidents which we perceive, yet there may perhaps be some inert, unperceiving substance or substratum of some other qualities, as incomprehensible to us as colours are to a man born blind, because we have not a sense adapted to them. ❋ Unknown (2006)
But, secondly, if we had a new sense it could only furnish us with new ideas or sensations; and then we should have the same reason against their existing in an unperceiving substance that has been already offered with relation to figure, motion, colour and the like. ❋ Unknown (2006)
But, if you stick to the notion of an unthinking substance or support of extension, motion, and other sensible qualities, then to me it is most evidently impossible there should be any such thing, since it is a plain repugnancy that those qualities should exist in or be supported by an unperceiving substance. ❋ Unknown (2006)
But it is evident from what we have already shown, that extension, figure, and motion are only ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance. ❋ Unknown (2006)
If it be allowed that no idea, nor anything like an idea, can exist in an unperceiving substance, then surely it follows that no figure, or mode of extension, which we can either perceive, or imagine, or have any idea of, can be really inherent in Matter; not to mention the peculiar difficulty there must be in conceiving a material substance, prior to and distinct from extension to be the SUBSTRATUM of extension. ❋ Unknown (2005)
And, it being too visibly absurd to hold that pain or pleasure can be in an unperceiving substance, men are more easily weaned from believing the external existence of the Secondary than the Primary Qualities. ❋ Unknown (2005)
This is my explication of your difficulty; and how it can serve to make your tenet of an unperceiving material SUBSTRATUM intelligible, I would fain know. ❋ Unknown (2005)
Can you then conceive it possible that they should exist in an unperceiving thing? ❋ Unknown (2005)
And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or pleasure? ❋ Unknown (2005)
You indeed, who by SNOW and fire mean certain external, unperceived, unperceiving substances, are in the right to deny whiteness or heat to be affections inherent in ❋ Unknown (2005)
I acknowledge, Philonous, that, upon a fair observation of what passes in my mind, I can discover nothing else but that I am a thinking being, affected with variety of sensations; neither is it possible to conceive how a sensation should exist in an unperceiving substance. ❋ Unknown (2005)
And, doth it not follow from your own concessions, that the perception of light and colours, including no action in it, may exist in an unperceiving substance? ❋ Unknown (2005)
I have no immediate intuition thereof: neither can I immediately from my sensations, ideas, notions, actions, or passions, infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive ❋ Unknown (2005)
I do not believe that it hath any figure or motion at all, being already convinced, that no sensible qualities can exist in an unperceiving substance. ❋ Unknown (2005)
Consequently, it cannot exist without the mind in an unperceiving substance, or body. ❋ Unknown (2005)
Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant to say — a thing which is inert operates on the mind, and which is unperceiving is the cause of our perceptions, without any regard either to consistency, or the old known axiom, NOTHING CAN GIVE TO ❋ Unknown (2005)
But, I do not know what is meant when it is said that an unperceiving substance hath inherent in it and supports either ideas or the archetypes of ideas. ❋ Unknown (2005)
SPIRIT, but Matter an unintelligent, unperceiving being. ❋ Unknown (2005)
But how is it possible that pain, be it as little active as you please, should exist in an unperceiving substance? ❋ Unknown (2005)
